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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes how electronic rulemaking is affecting the 
propensity of interest groups to file comments and replies at the 
Federal Communications Commission.  The paper shows that 
exogenous events and a handful of issues drive filing behavior.  
Implications of the analysis are discussed.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There have recently been a number of empirical papers examining 
the micro-detail of e-rulemaking.  Most of these papers conduct 
an in-depth analysis of a single or very small sample of docketed 
proceedings or issues before an agency to determine the 
mechanics, mechanisms, and success of e-rulemaking. [1,2,3,4]  
This paper uses data on all electronic filings at the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to examine how e-
rulemaking has changed the nature and composition of filings.  In 
this paper, the identification of broad trends in e-filings is the 
focus, one that may be overlooked in the micro-analysis found in 
other work. 
2. DATA 
The data used here were kindly provided the FCC Reference 
Information Center.  Since 1999, this Office of the FCC has 
tracked, on a monthly basis, the number of electronic filings the 
FCC has received through its Electronic Comment Filings System 
(ECFS).  Figure 1a provides a graph of the number of ECFS 
filings at the FCC from January 1999 to December 2004.  There is 
a noticeable jump in the number of electronic filings in October 
2004 and a smaller jump in electronic filings in October 2002.  
Figure 1b presents the same data, with October 2004 omitted, and 
the data rescaled to reflect the lower variance in electronic filings.  
An additional pattern is noticeable.  There is another small 
increase in the months proceeding the September 11 terrorist 
attacks upon the United States, and yet another in October 2002.   
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Figure 1a:  Number of Monthly ECFS Filings, 1999-2004 
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Figure 1b:  Number of Monthly ECFS Filings Omitting 
October 2004, 1999-2004 
3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
From 1999-2004, the Commission had electronic rulemaking 
infrastructure.  Yet, except for these four events, the filings during 
this time look much like the filings when there was only a paper 
filing option.  In four cases, however, there was an increase in 
filings.  What has caused the increases in filings?  The claim here 
is that two basic types of events will catalyze interest groups to 
increase their use of the electronic rulemaking infrastructure:  
exogenous events and issues.  Exogenous events are those events 
which occur that are outside the control of the Commission.  
Issues are those very few dockets that attract interest group 
attention to the Commission, and thus cause a spike in filings. 
 
In the months after September 11, the U.S. was on-guard against 
terrorism and worried about an Anthrax scare.  Lobbyist, lawyers, 
and interest groups, not wishing to expose themselves to harm, 
shifted away from paper filings to electronic filings.  These types 
of events are exogenous—they are out of the control of the 
Commission and are largely unpredictable.  The spikes in filings 
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in October 2002 and 2004 are due to two issues that were before 
the Commission:  The Telecommunications Protection Act (Do-
Not-Call List) and the Media Ownership Rules (limiting how 
many media outlets and market share that one company could 
own in a media market).  These are Issues that increase in filings.  
4. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
To examine the validity of these claims, a statistical analysis is of 
monthly ECFS data is conducted.  To do this, two ordinary least 
squares regressions are run where the dependent variable is the 
number of ECFS filings in a given month, beginning in January 
1999.  We examine two main independent variables.  The first 
independent variable, Exogenous Events, is an indicator variable 
which is equal to one for the months covering the three months 
after the September 11 attacks and the months covering the 
Anthrax scare (December 2001 to May 2002), and zero otherwise.  
It is designed to measure how these exogenous events affected 
ECFS filing behavior.  The second variable, which is named 
Issues, is an indicator variable which is equal to one for the 
months in which the Do-Not-Call List and Media Ownership 
Rules (first and second review) were being considered by the 
Commission, and zero otherwise.  It is designed to measure the 
effect that these issues had on ECFS filing behavior.   
 
In addition to these variables of interest, the statistical analysis 
includes a constant, and a variable called Trend, which is a count 
variable starting with 1 in the first month of the sample and 
counting each additional month.  This variable is designed to 
control for variables that are increasing over time, such as more 
issues before the Commission, more inherent participation by 
interested parties in issues, and the rise of e-advocacy and 
information technology over time.   All months preceding the 
variable of interest the months with the variable of interest are 
used.1  The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1. 
 
Model 1 presents the results with the Exogenous Events variable, 
and Model 2 presents the results with the Issues variable.  In all 
Models, the F-statistic shows that the coefficients are jointly 
statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence, despite the 
relatively small number of observations.  The standard errors are 
in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
 
In Model 1, the coefficient on Exogenous Events is both positive 
and statistically significant.  The coefficient means that in the 
months after the September 11 attack, there was an increase of 
671 filings per month on the ECFS system.  In Model 2, only the 
coefficient on Issues is statistically significant.  A “key” issue 
before the Commission results in a 6,796 increase in monthly 
ECFS filings.  These results hold even when we include the Trend 
variable in the models. 
 
                                                                 
1 For example, in Model 1, we measure the impact of Terror on ECFS 
filing behavior.  We include in the sample frame all months preceding 
the September 11 terror attacks (January 1999 to September 2001) and 
the three months immediately after the terror attacks (October 2001 to 
December 2001). 
Table 1. Table captions should be placed above the table 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Exogenous Events 671.27 (117.14)  
Issues  6,796.36 (2862.04) 
Trend 8.03 (3.92) 
68.91 
(51.40) 
Constant 229.08 (76.58) 
-1,354.02 
(1,982.71) 
n 41 71 
F-Statistic 50.25 6.05 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
A number of ideas can be taken away from the descriptive data 
and this analysis.  First, exogenous events and issues do cause 
spikes in e-filings.  Second, these events are quite rare.  That is, 
during the entire six years of data presented, only two exogenous 
events or issues registered a significant effect on filing behavior.  
Third, most issues seem unaffected by e-filings rules, outside of 
these four instances.  That is, electronic rule-making does not 
seem to noticeably alter filing behavior.  In all other instances, e-
filing looked very much like the paper filing regime before it.  
That leads to a fourth conclusion, that a “build-it-and-they-will-
come” attitude for IT infrastructure development will likely not 
work.  Finally, we must be careful about what we learn from 
empirical studies of e-rulemaking.  A sample frame that includes 
only dockets with many filings may be sampling only outlier 
dockets.  That is, the lessons we learn from these studies may not 
be generalizable.2 
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